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to provide humanitarian or disaster relief are one of our nation's foremost and enduring symbols of power and commitment to national security. This reality unequivocally demonstrates the nation's capability to react in times of crisis to address threats to our national security and global interests.
Mobilization, however, is much broader than just calling up or deploying troop units;
instead it is:
The process whereby a nation makes the transition from a normal state of peacetime preparedness to a war-fighting posture. It involves the assembly, organization, and application of the nation's resources for national defense. The mobilization process encompasses all activities necessary to prepare systematically and selectively for war. The ability to mobilize effectively contributes to the deterrence of war.
2 Thus, when initiated, mobilization provides a systematic methodology to harness the means chosen by our government's senior leaders to leverage a key element of our national power through the use of the military option. The U.S. Army is currently engaged in its most protracted mobilization effort since the end of World War II. 3 Mobilization of our military assets is indeed an essential element of our National Military Strategy (NMS). 4 Enabling the nation's armed forces to mobilize in a decisive manner requires substantial sustaining infrastructure, including a multitude of resources and management systems, power projection and support facilities, and equipment located outside operational theaters. This infrastructure creates, provides, and sustains the combatant commander's joint and multinational force. 5 Without this sustaining infrastructure, there is no access to national assets to support the NMS. At Army installations, the sustaining base provides the fundamental level of this support. Army installations are a critical component of this infrastructure. In fact, 83 percent of all forces supporting Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) were projected from and continue to be supported by Army installations in some fashion or another. 6 Unfortunately, the mobilization effort that the Army has been involved in since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 has also revealed the dreadful state of its aging infrastructure and installation readiness. 7 Indeed, the Army's ability to take care of its troops has been questioned at the highest levels of our leadership. 8 Army installations have struggled to sustain their infrastructure while supporting current and ongoing missions, and simultaneously provide facilities and support to mobilizing forces engaged in Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), OEF, and OIF. For example, the mobilization dilemma at many Army installations resulted in Senator Cochairs Kit Bond (R-Mo.), and Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) of the U.S. Senate National Guard Caucus to request a comprehensive study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to determine the severity of the housing problem for both AC and RC personnel at all Army mobilization sites 9 . The GAO report cited disparities in the Army's mobilization process, and also concluded that the Army's current approach to address many of their mobilization challenges does not coordinate all the support costs across its' mobilization infrastructure in order to most efficiently support the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) 10 . Without question, the current mobilization effort has additionally stressed an aging installation infrastructure.
However, stress on our military infrastructure from the current national crisis is not the only indicator pointing to a long-recognized need for improving infrastructure management. The concept of a modular Army, known as the Army Modular Force, and the permanent return of forces [Restationing] from overseas add the to Army's installation challenges. Together with the GWOT, these simultaneous changes severely compound the installation infrastructure readiness challenge.
The modular Army concept reorganizes the force, creating an additional ten to fifteen maneuver brigade size units, made up of approximately 3,000 to 3,800 Soldiers each. These modular formations will be established in the AC, supplemented by a yet-to-be-determined number of formations that will be distributed across the Reserve and National Guard components. 11 The strategy will produce the force depth and unit flexibility necessary to meet the challenges of the 21 st century, and are designed to be a self-supporting component of the force structure designed; to meet the challenges of asymmetric warfare, to reduce the deployment cycle on Army units, and to support the NMS. 12 The concept does not increase the overall Army endstrength, but given the impact its' had on Army installations thus far, the reorganization could significantly impact both installation infrastructure, and sustaining base requirements.
Most recently, at Fort Stewart, Georgia, the location of the first modular unit, installation managers, Army Corps of Engineers, and construction workers are engaged in a race against time. The Fort will be home to the first modularized unit, but basic installation infrastructure must be built to accommodate this new organization. 13 To accomplish the task, funding streams form Military Construction Army (MCA), Operations and Maintenance Army (OMA), and Other Procurement Army (OPA) have been used to finance the rapid expansion of the sustaining base to meet the Army's needs. An expedient concept used during past mobilizations to meet the nation's needs. At the center of the controversy is the $15 million cost of removing asbestos from the soil at the former Air Force base, which is now home to hundreds who have taken up residence in over 2,800 homes that cost over $500 thousand each, on average. Parks and shopping centers have also been built on the former base. 39 Other former military installations pose significant environmental liabilities. The Alameda Naval Air Station, California has similar problems.
Although this property has yet to be developed, environmental cleanup costs will range from $180 million to $450 million. Here the potential land managers are not moving ahead until environmental issues are resolved. In the meantime, the Air Station and many others like it continue to threaten the environment and drain defense dollars. 40 Under the current administration, the Services have enjoyed some fiscal relief from environmental regulators, but administration and political tides can easily reverse the current trend. If the course changes, the DoD could be facing hundreds of millions of dollars to deal with pollution on both former and active military installations.
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The environmental news does not get any better with time. According to the GAO, an estimated 15 million acres of military land is considered polluted. The costs for environmental cleanup in the 1,400 sites range from $8 billion to $35 billion. With our current annual spending at $200 million for munitions clean up alone; it could take a century to deal with environmental matters.
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The first four BRAC rounds were estimated to cost $23 billion, but they would yield a savings of $36.5 billion, creating a total net savings of $13.5 billion once the rounds where concluded. 43 Other estimates projected savings of near $17 billion. 44 These estimates included assumptions beyond the elusive environmental estimates as mentioned earlier. One such DoD assumption is that half of the savings will be gained from assumed savings in Operation & Maintenance (O&M) costs. There is no indication of whether that estimate is based on the fully funded rate, which is something that is essentially unheard of in the installation business.
However, the O&M savings estimates are based primarily on reductions in civilian personnel, not the reduction of infrastructure. 45 Despite such measures, the nation's defense infrastructure has suffered from chronic underfunding and neglect. Defense infrastructure and facilities are supported in two ways:
through sustainment and recapitalization. In recent years, sustainment was funded at 75-80 percent of the recognized requirements necessary to meet facilities and installation objectives.
Since World War II, underfunding has systematically accelerated the decline of our installations'
infrastructure. This underfunding came at times when there was insufficient funding to sustain existing capabilities. Likewise, during the daunting and often deliberate process of balancing mission readiness requirements and installation infrastructure sustainment, the scales persistently tipped in a direction that did not favor a robust installation sustainment program, not to mention recapitalization. From an installation manager's perspective, the signals were clear:
Reduced resource streams would make effective facility management nearly impossible; in fact, 48 This investment strategy initially lowers the Army's recapitalization rate to 107 years; it represents a significant effort to counter the rising recapitalization rate. 49 To meet the Army's target rate 67-year goal, the next four budgeting cycles must sustain a recapitalization-funding rate of no less than $675 million annually.
New construction will initially reduce the recapitalization rate, but under the ValuedEngineering (VE) concept this reduction can be misleading. The Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE) formally defines VE as "the organized study of functions to satisfy user needs with a quality facility at the lowest life-cycle cost through applied creativity." 50 However, too often it is used to reduce the costs of MCA projects when bids are above authorized program limits. This short-term strategy reduces initial construction costs by decreasing subsystems' quality, which ultimately reduces the longevity of those facility subsystems. Typically, major subsystems such as roofing systems and Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) systems fall victim to the VE cost-cutting process. Practices that include replacing standing seam roofs with shingle type designs and high efficient HVAC systems with less efficient models are used to ensure the up-front building costs are contained within programmed estimates. These initial short-term cost avoidance measures translate into long-term sustainment challenges that further erode the sustaining base. Many of today's installation challenges are the inevitable outcome of decades of underfunding and pushing bills into the future.
THE TRICKLE DOWN EFFECT
For the Army, adequately funding the sustaining base to support mobilization essentially comes down to the funding and management of two essential installation accounts: SRM, and
Base Operations Support (BOS). These accounts are the lifeblood of the Army Installation; they sustain a detectable heart rate on existing and future installation infrastructure. The Army sustainment funding for FY04-09 was budgeted at 82 percent, far less than the previous year.
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Restoration and modernization for Army facilities has actually never been funded. Despite the lack of funding for these critical accounts, Army installations have managed to keep the lights on by supplementing these accounts with mission dollars. However, this practice has created the illusion that funding levels were sufficient, when in fact they are woefully underfunded. In the end this practice degraded the funding metrics used to forecast and sustain these accounts, further contributing to the neglect of installations, and the Army's capability to assess overall installation readiness.
Without formal protection or "fencing" of installation resource, they have often been considered low-hanging fruit, ready for picking in the resources management business.
Management decisions have led to easy transferring, or reduction of these dollars, often without reimbursement. These transfers were often a result of a command redirect, which essentially used these dollars as bill payers for non-SRM and BOS related requirements. 52 Senior Mission Commanders (SMC) who also served as installation commanders made such decisions to meet short-term contingencies. In most cases such individuals were charged with keeping watch over scarce installation dollars, but they also had a mission responsibility. Given the complexities, demands, and pressures associated with mission readiness, it is neither unreasonable nor unexpected to see decisions that favored a grander strategy of unit readiness in support of the NMS. However, the lack of a holistic strategic vision for Army installations all but eliminated the advocacy needed to secure funding in the Army's Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Executing System (PPBES) to support the requirements the Army struggles with today, both tactically and operationally, at the installation. Indeed, the Army's decaying installation infrastructure has finally emerged as a strategic issue.
To address Army installation readiness at the strategic level, the Army developed a management tool to quantify installation readiness. The Installation Status Report (ISR) takes a significant step in the right direction. It makes installation readiness an issue at the senior levels of the Army. The ISR is now equivalent to the mission Commanders' Unit Status Report (USR).
The ISR assesses the condition of installation infrastructure, environmental programs, and base support services using established Army-wide standards codified in Army Regulation 210-14,
The Army ISR Program. 53 The ISR provides executive level information to senior Army leaders to validate, prioritize, and strengthen management actions and decision-making that influence However, other command complexities negatively impacted installation funding.
Under the former MACOM system, installation command tours typically did not exceed two to three years; therefore these time constraints had limited opportunity to influence the strategic direction of "their" installations. Further complicating the situation at the strategic level was the fact that SMCs reported to one of many MACOMs within the Army. These MACOMs 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REVERSING THE TREND: SOLIDIFYING THE STRATEGIC LINK BETWEEN MOBILIZATION, INSTALLATION SUPPORT INFRASTRUCTURE, AP3 AND BEYOND
First, the IMA and ACSIM should be consolidated and recognized as a MACOM organization. Its primary purpose is to review and integrate the fifteen different MACOM installation management philosophies into one cohesive Army installation management function. 57 In order to do this successfully, the agencies must be organized Currently, IMA regional directors rate garrison commanders within their regional area of responsibility, and the SMC senior rates these individuals. 60 This rating scheme places the GCs in a situation where they serve two senior leaders and organizations, each with different views regarding installation priorities and strategic direction. In my view, this creates a dilemma for GCs, and is inconsistent with the Army's standard overall rating scheme. This disconnect should be realigned to reflect centralized management oversight within the IMA. This situation would most likely be corrected if the IMA were organizationally aligned as a MACOM, and further serve in clarifying the planning and execution of complex initiatives for GCs who must be responsive in their support to MACOM and SMCs installation requirements. This change would also create an organization that offers an upward mobility structure that is currently lacking for those who serve in garrison command billets. Today, GCs have limited career prospects beyond a GC assignment in the current organizational design. As a minimum these commanders should be managed in such a way that ensures a garrison command is not a last assignment. Without this level of support and strategic planning, the Army is destined to repeat its mobilization history. This checkered history will be repeated due to poor mobilization planning and programming -and an organizational mismatch that exploits underfunded SRM and BOS accounts to make up for a lack of strategic direction in this critical area. Alternately, the AP3S could be managed by the IMA as a MACOM, but it must have the support of the Army G3 in order to exploit the momentum necessary to break through the Army's own bureaucracy and then to achieve the impact necessary to implement a strategic program with purposeful longevity.
Sixth, the Army must seize the current opportunity to seek a holistic funding to support its infrastructure preparedness strategy while the administration's and public's support are high. If we do not take advantage of the current window of opportunity, we risk encountering more skepticism from the public and Congressional leaders. Inaction is simply not an option. If we fail to fund the AP3S infrastructure, the problem will only be exasperated as we continue the current protracted mobilization.
Seventh, to increase the probability for securing support, Army leaders should strongly Today, each of the Services manages their bases/installations independently with sporadic consistencies in terms of collective readiness relative to a single DoD standard. 64 The asymmetric threats that typify the 21 st Century in which our department must respond to, and ultimately our forces must operate in demand an unprecedented joint operational effort. The relevance and timeliness brought about by the Goldwaters-Nichols Act of 1986, set in motion an era of "Jointness" that now must be expanded beyond joint operational concepts, to joint base/installation management concepts to better serve the nation both abroad and in the homeland.
There are however similarities that should be managed under a single Continued inaction will only prolong inefficient installation management practices.
Competing for installation funding amidst the vast array of current requirements will be no easy task. Indeed, competition may not only be limited to the Services, or other federal agencies, but may extend to individual states. The DoD leaders should explore, and where possible, exploit these funding strategies.
CONCLUSION
Creation of the Installation Management Agency (IMA) is perhaps one of the most significant business decisions the Army has ever made. "In terms of institutional transformation, the Installation Management Agency implements best business practices into how we run our installations and communities. It is simply a smarter way to do business." "Resistance to change is a natural tendency of both humans and large organizations, but in this world characterized by accelerating change it is a strategic liability." 66 Knowing that pressures on organizations to change are never-ending, Army leaders should continue to seize opportunities to transform the way installations are managed as strategic assets. 67 The IMA and Army leaders must remain ever vigilant of the forces that not only threaten the IMAs survival, but also creates vulnerabilities that threaten its timely and necessary expansion into the strategic arena. Given the current operating environment in the Army, the forces to discredit the IMA concept, or reduce it to an ineffective organization, are perhaps already upon us.
Reversing the gains already made would place our nation's strategic mobilization infrastructure and the sustaining base in further jeopardy. Our nation can ill afford such a reversal.
History has shown us that defense spending declines once major demobilization operations are completed, reflecting the changes in both political and national priorities. The
Army leadership should provide for the defense infrastructure funding by programming for and fully funding the future installation infrastructure. They should also seek to fully fund the 
